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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 204 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 31/01/1993 
Where it occurred: Phumi Tnaot, 
Sisiphon, Battambang 
Province 
Country: Cambodia 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident 
(survey) 
Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: Witness 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
route (verge) 
Date record created: 15/02/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
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 Accident report 
The date of this accident is an approximation. 
No record of this accident was held by the country MAC. The country MAC did not formally 
exist when the accident occurred and any records have been lost. Details of this report were 
given by a member of the French Foreign Legion (FFL) scheduled to replace one of the 
victims. He visited one of the victims in hospital in Paris and heard the story at first hand. He 
has subsequently left the Legion and was working in Cambodia as Technical Advisor to a well 
known demining NGO when interviewed in January 1999. The following summarises his 
verbal report. 
The French Foreign Legion were in control of demining in the region. A three-man team 
comprising the two victims and a Lieutenant went to area to carry out a reconnaissance prior 
to deploying deminers. The suspected mined area was alongside a road. Following the drills 
at the time, the officer stood by the vehicle while the two sergeants took a detector in one 
hand and a prodder in the other and started making exploratory lanes away from the road and 
at right angles to it. No markings were used. It is very likely that the two were working close 
together. They worked in to a depth of approximately 20-25m and then turned around and 
worked their way back to the road with their paths describing an elongated "U". 
Victim No,1 was working with Victim No.2 to his right when he saw a bush with a pile of PMN-
2 mines beneath it. He crouched to peer under the bush, suspecting the cache might be 
booby trapped. Having seen no sign of a trap he stepped back and initiated a buried PMN-2 
with his right heel.  
Victim No.2 was "less than ten metres away". He received fragment injuries to his arm and 
fragments of molten plastic in his leg which cut his tendons. 
The Lieutenant had no trauma kit and was not a medic. He also had no means to safely 
evacuate the victims. He was not in radio contact with base. He drove away for help and 
returned about an hour later by helicopter. The helicopter landed in the suspect area 
alongside the victims and they were evacuated. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 261 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Above knee 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 262 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Arm 
severe Leg 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available. 
Both victims were taken to France for treatment. Victim No.2 was visited in hospital while 
receiving plastic surgery by the reporter of the accident.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the management of the operation had failed to put in place very basic operating procedures 
that would have made the accident less likely to have occurred and would have made a hasty 
evacuation possible.  
This accident illustrates the need for established radio contact, medical support and Medevac 
set-up before working in a suspect area. It also shows how vague the terms "reconnaissance" 
and "survey" are. The failures to mark cleared areas or maintain a safe working distance 
exacerbated the accident by hampering recovery. The landing of the helicopter in the suspect 
area was also unnecessarily risky. 
The general lack of preparation, safety drills and equipment make it unlikely that safety 
equipment (which is not mentioned) was worn. It also seems unlikely that the Victims were 
appropriately trained to carry out the task in hand safely. The secondary cause is listed as 
“Inadequate training”. 
The mine was a PMN-2, which is usually easy to locate and should not have been missed if 
the victims had been working appropriately (the detector in use was not known).  
 
3 
